Bioterrorism Preparedness: Smallpox and Related Pox Viruses by Lawhorn, D. Bruce
In the event of a major bioterrorist
attack involving smallpox, veterinari-
ans, physicians, allied health profes-
sionals and the general public must
be well prepared. Unlike bioterrorist
agents that cause diseases such as
anthrax, bubonic plague, tularemia
and brucellosis that infect many
species, including human beings,
smallpox infects only primates. It is
the first choice of viral bioterrorist
agents; it has killed more people
throughout history than any other
disease. 
Veterinarians, veterinary technicians,
animal caretakers and zoo visitors
could be greatly affected in the event
of a smallpox outbreak among cap-
tive sub-human primates. Human
beings are the predominant smallpox
host, but monkeys may become
infected and transmit the virus to
other monkeys and possibly people.
A smallpox epidemic in Brazil was
associated with an outbreak in mon-
keys; the bodies of dead animals
were covered with smallpox pustules.
In 1951, an orangutan in a zoo devel-
oped smallpox during an outbreak in
Djakarta, Indonesia. 
In recent years, concerns over dis-
eases such as Ebola have drastically
restricted the importation of mon-
keys. However, large populations
exist in research facilities and zoos
across the United States. Conse-
quently, human and sub-human 
primate populations in the United
States, which are both susceptible to
smallpox, coexist in close and contin-
uous contact. 
At one time, almost everyone con-
tracted smallpox. The two forms of
smallpox were variola major, which
had a 30 percent fatality rate, and
variola minor that killed about 1 per-
cent of its victims. Variola virus
(smallpox virus) is in the family
Poxviridae, genus Orthopoxvirus.
Three out of six other viruses of this
genus — cowpox, vaccinia and mon-
keypox (horsepox,another closely
related orthopoxvirus, is also includ-
ed in older literature) — can infect
people. Smallpox is the only one in
this genus that readily spreads from
person to person. These four viruses
are so closely related that infection
with one generally confers immunity
to the others. For example, vaccina-
tion with vaccinia protects human
beings against smallpox (the very
first effective smallpox vaccine con-
tained cowpox virus); vaccination
with vaccinia protects animal care-
takers and researchers against mon-
keypox. Since smallpox has been
eradicated, monkeypox is rare but
remains the only smallpox-like dis-
ease in nature (if transmitted to
human beings). 
Smallpox Characteristics
Made Eradication
Possible
How was smallpox eradicated while
many other infectious diseases
remain? Although smallpox eradica-
tion was accomplished after a colos-
sal and persistent global effort, the
biologic characteristics of the virus
actually made this feasible: 
 No wildlife reservoir — Smallpox
virus never existed in wildlife.
Consequently, it could not become
active and be transmitted from
wildlife to humans (except for pos-
sible temporary transmission from
sub-human primates to humans).
 No reservoir or carrier host —
Because no other mammals get
smallpox (except for short-term
infection in subhuman primates),
then recover and harbor the virus
in their bodies, they cannot serve
as carriers of the virus to infect
people.
 No persistent infection with recur-
rent disease and virus shedding in
human beings. Once a person
recovers from the disease, he/she
does not permanently carry that
infection in his or her system to
infect others or to recur at a later
date.
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 No subclinical cases — Smallpox
cases are easy to recognize.
Persons with the virus exhibit
fever, skin rash and obvious signs
of infection.
 During the incubation period
(from 7 to 17 days), a patient was
not contagious. After that point,
the patient developed usuallly a
high fever, head and body aches
and sometimes vomiting for 2 to 4
days (prodrome phase), then a
rash. The patient was most conta-
gious from the onset of the rash
through the first 7 to 10 days of
rash. However, until the scabs
have fallen off and the skin lesions
have healed, the patient is still
contagious.
 Only one smallpox serotype or
strain — In contrast to disease
agents that have many strain vari-
ations with each requiring a spe-
cific vaccine, smallpox has only
one type. As a result, only one
vaccine was needed.
 An effective vaccine existed.
 Only one dose of vaccine was
required for long term protection.
 Early containment of outbreaks
was possible by vaccinating
human beings in and around an
outbreak area (called ring vaccina-
tion), isolating persons who may
have been exposed (quarantine)
and by surveillance to detect new
smallpox cases.
 A high level of public concern due
to the potential 30 percent mortali-
ty rate in unvaccinated persons
and severe scarring in those
patients who did recover.
Smallpox Risks Remain
After Eradication
After 1980, smallpox virus existed
only in two World Health Organi-
zation laboratories — the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia, and the
Institute of Virus Preparation in
Moscow, Russia. However, scientists
believe that the Soviet Union’s
bioweapons program produced many
tons of smallpox virus annually for
delivery in bombs and intercontinen-
tal ballistic missiles beginning in
1980. Furthermore, it was reported
that Russia expanded this program to
produce more virulent and conta-
gious recombinant smallpox strains
(strains produced by combining
genes from different organisms).
Credible experts fear that, since the
fall of Communism, these viruses
The last endemic case of smallpox occurred in Somalia
in October 1977. Before this, smallpox killed more peo-
ple than any other infectious disease — more than 300
million — and those who recovered were permanently
scarred. Some of these deaths occurred when smallpox
was used as a biologic weapon. 
British forces in North America were probably the first
to use smallpox as an offensive weapon during the
French and Indian War (1754-1767). Blankets used by
smallpox patients were distributed for the sole purpose
of starting outbreaks among American Indians, who
were a totally susceptible population. As a result, more
than 50 percent of exposed and affected tribes were
killed. 
The origins of inoculation to prevent disease actually
began with centuries-old observation that individuals
who survived certain diseases did not have recur-
rences. In ancient China and later in western Asia,
fluid from vesicles (sores) of persons with smallpox
was inoculated (introduced) into the skin of noninfect-
ed individuals in an attempt to specifically protect
against smallpox. In 1721, Lady Mary Wortley
Montague, wife of the British ambassador to Turkey, is
credited with introduction of variolation (inoculation
with smallpox virus) into England. This practice of
inoculation with virulent smallpox virus from even
mildly infected patients was very risky, resulting in sig-
nificant disease and mortality. By 1840, the practice of
variolation was banned. 
In the late 1700s in England, it was common folk
knowledge that cowpox infection in milkmaids protect-
ed against smallpox. Noting this observation, Benjamin
Jesty, a Dorsetshire farmer, reportedly inoculated his
wife and children with cowpox in 1774. However, no
scientifically based study was undertaken until May
1796, when Edward Jenner, a young Gloucestershire
physician, inoculated a young boy named James Phipps
with cowpox. The boy later proved immune to small-
pox. Jenner published “An Inquiry into the Causes and
Effects of Variolae Vaccinae” in 1798. His medical peers
thereafter accepted this vaccination method as a valid
tool for preventing smallpox. 
The worldwide dissemination of cowpox inoculation
reduced the likelihood that smallpox would be used as
a biologic weapon and set the stage for the eventual
eradication of the disease. Jenner’s work also started
the use of the term “vaccination” that comes from the
Latin word “vacca,” which means cow. Coined original-
ly to refer to inoculation of smallpox vaccine, it now is
used to apply to any immunizing procedure for which
an antigen is injected.
By 1978, a global vaccination program had successfully
rid the world of smallpox. In 1980, the World Health
Assembly recommended that all countries stop vaccina-
tion.
Smallpox in History
may have fallen into the hands of
terrorists to be used as weapons. 
To use this virus as a weapon, it is
necessary to deliver that agent to its
target. Smallpox virus dispersed by
missiles or bombs could be devastat-
ing. Such a release could spread
widely because only a small dose is
needed to cause disease and because
the variola virus in aerosol form is
relatively stable. In addition, each
case of smallpox during the
December to April period of highest
transmissibility could produce 10 to
20 additional cases. 
Spreading smallpox virus by an
infected, individual terrorist may not
be as likely since the disease would
be so severe by the time the small-
pox virus was contagious that the ter-
rorist would no longer be ambulato-
ry. Also, the pox lesions all over the
body would be noticeable to
observers and impossible to hide.
However, another point of view is
that the possible spread of smallpox
by infected terrorists is the most
plausible introductory method.
Nevertheless, the diagnosis of even a
single case of smallpox cannot be
minimized; it would be of extreme
concern and should be handled as a
possible international health emer-
gency.
Countermeasures
The likely countermeasures to a
smallpox virus bioterrorist attack
would include: 
 More rapid identification of cases
— Normally, there would be one
to two weeks from release until
the first index case because of a
long incubation period. A long,
undetected incubation period
allows an outbreak to become too
widespread.
 Isolation and vaccination in a wide
area around an outbreak of pre-
sumed infected and exposed indi-
viduals (ring vaccination).
 Surveillance of exposed individu-
als and their contacts.
 Decontamination procedures (ordi-
nary disinfectants like hypochlo-
rite [bleach] and quaternary
ammonia products inactivate
smallpox). Deceased smallpox
patients should be cremated.
Because smallpox does not live
longer than two days in the envi-
ronment, even under the most
ideal conditions, by the time the
first case is diagnosed, no environ-
mental virus contamination would
likely be present from the original
terrorist release to cause any new
cases. 
Although smallpox virus in scabs
may be viable for as long as 13 years,
it is not thought to be contagious.
The scab prevents the virus from
being transmitted through inhalation,
which is its normal method of
spread. Also, smallpox has a long
incubation period (12 to 14 days,
seven to 17 day range) and is not
contagious until a rash appears. If
vaccination is performed within the
first few days (and perhaps as late as
four days) of exposure, illness from
smallpox may be significantly
reduced. 
The United States maintains a stock-
pile of at least 15.4 million doses of
smallpox vaccine, enough to vacci-
nate about 7 percent of the popula-
tion. The government is making
every effort to expand the vaccine
supply. Recent experimental work at
the National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases, Baylor College of
Medicine in Houston and two other
institutions has demonstrated that
the standard vaccinia vaccine against
smallpox is potent even when diluted
to one-fifth strength. The researchers
are optimistic that adequate protec-
tion may even be possible with vac-
cine used at a 1 to 10 dilution. These
studies are scheduled to be published
in the New England Journal of
Medicine in late April 2002
(http://www.nejm.org).
Researchers have reportedly found
approximately 90 million long-forgot-
ten doses of smallpox vaccine in the
freezers at Aventis Pasteur, a French
drug firm in Pennsylvania. Most of
this vaccine has been donated to the
U.S. government. Baylor College of
Medicine researchers in Houston are
designing a study to test the effec-
tiveness of the newly-found vaccine.
In addition, the U.S. government has
contracted with Acambis/Baxter to
produce 209 million doses of a “sec-
ond-generation” (made not directly
from an animal but from cell culture)
vaccinia vaccine. As a result, by the
end of 2002, it is estimated that a
total of at least 286 million doses of
vaccine will be stockpiled.
The Disadvantages of
Vaccination
Vaccination does have drawbacks. In
addition to the estimated one person
per million that would likely die
“Expanding our existing smallpox vaccine stockpile ensures
that we are well prepared in the event of a bioterrorist
attack using smallpox. This new contract gives us the
insurance that we will have more than enough vaccine for
any outbreak that might occur.” — Dr. D.A. Henderson,
director of the Office of Public Health Preparedness,
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and
leader of the World Health Organization’s successful
worldwide program to eradicate smallpox, 2002
“These encouraging results [studies on diluted vaccine] sug-
gest that we can do more with less and thereby extend our
capacity to contain a potential smallpox outbreak.” — Dr.
Anthony S. Fauci, director, National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases, 2002
Smallpox Experts are Now Very Optimistic about Preparedness Options
from the vaccine, an estimated total
of 250 persons per million inoculated
will suffer reactions to the available
vaccine. These reactions may be
severe enough to require administra-
tion of Vaccinia Immune Globulin
(VIG, an antidote). However, VIG is
in short supply and is cumbersome
to administer since large doses are
required (0.3 to 0.6 ml/kg IM in
divided doses over 24 to 36 hour
period — 21 to 42 ml in a 70 kg [154
pound] person). VIG may also pre-
vent or modify smallpox if given
within 24 hours of exposure.
Currently, the CDC provides vaccinia
vaccine and VIG through state health
departments only to persons in spe-
cial risk categories such as laboratory
workers directly involved with small-
pox or closely related viruses.
How long does protection last in
those previously vaccinated for
smallpox? Routine vaccination in the
United States stopped in 1972. Since
at least 42 percent of the American
population (those younger than 30
years old) has never been vaccinated
and few persons alive today have
been vaccinated more than once,
most scientists believe that almost
everyone in the United States is sus-
ceptible to smallpox infection.
However, this is another issue
regarding smallpox that continues to
be debated.
Future Needs for
Smallpox Preparedness
To prepare for a bioterrorist attack
with smallpox, the United States
needs, first, a rapid, simple orophar-
ynx (throat) swab test to identify the
smallpox virus before any clinical
signs develop (eg. polymerase chain
reaction [PCR] test). Prompt vaccina-
tion of individuals who test positive
to the infection early in the incuba-
tion period would help prevent
spread. 
Second, a vaccine that produces
fewer adverse reactions is needed.
The “second-generation” vaccine that
the government has contracted to be
produced is made in cell culture,
rather than calf skin. The newer vac-
cine, to be available by the end of
2002, will be as effective but still
retains the risks of traditional vac-
cinia vaccines. Consequently, scien-
tists are now focusing on developing
a safer “third-generation” vaccine.
Third, an alternative to VIG is need-
ed because it is difficult to produce
and administer (it requires large
amounts of antidote per person). An
immune globulin containing mono-
clonal antibodies against smallpox
and produced in human cell culture
has been suggested as a possible
replacement. Antiviral drugs that are
already on the market or near
approved status could also be tested
for use against smallpox.
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